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THE  OBJECTIVE  of this paper  is to fit the horizontal  trend  in "M2  veloc- 
ity," observed  for about a decade and a half, into a somewhat  broader 
framework  in which  the regularity  falls in place. The behavior  of income 
velocity-or  of its reciprocal,  which  expresses  money  holdings  per unit of 
income-is  important  because  it discloses  the money  demand  correspond- 
ing to alternative  levels of money  income.  Appraising  this relationship  is 
necessary  to devising  a rational  macro  policy. 
Though  our notion of a broader  framework  is modest,  it nevertheless 
includes  the broadest  money-supply  aggregates  (M) ;1 and because  it in- 
cludes  interest  rates,  it will also give  a window  toward  other  assets.  Aware- 
ness of the regularity  we discuss is not a substitute  for more complex 
methods  of appraising  the probable  course  of events. "Judgmental"  ele- 
ments must be allowed  to enter into these projections  regardless  of ap- 
proach,  and  no case  can  be made  for  projecting  trends  mechanically.  Howe 
ever, because  the regularity  we discuss  has been consistent  for well over 
1. A satisfactory definition  of M] is currency  outside the banks and the Treasury 
plus demand deposits (checking deposits) other than those of the U.S. government 
and interbank; M2 is  M1 plus time deposits and savings accounts in commercial 
banks other than negotiable certificates of deposit of $100,000 or more; M3 is M2 
plus deposits in thrift institutions (savings and loan associations, mutual savings 
banks, and credit unions); M4 (which will not be used in this paper) is M2 plus the 
large negotiable CDs; M5 is M3 plus the large negotiable CDs. 
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a decade and can be interpreted  reasonably,  there  is no justification  for 
overlooking  it. 
In brief, during  the past quarter-century,  the broadest  M categories- 
M3 and M5, both of which contain major  interest-yielding  components 
that cannot  be used directly  as means  of payments-have so far behaved 
as "luxury  goods": their ratio to the gross national  product  has been 
rising  with  the real  GNP of the American  economy.  In cross-sections,  this 
phenomenon  would not necessarily  be reflected  throughout  the income 
scale.2 
Within  the more inclusive  categories  of M, the ratio of the higher-  to 
the lower-yielding  components  has risen  since World  War  II. The growth 
rate of the ratio of the non-Ml component  of M2 (that is, commercial- 
bank time deposits  and savings  accounts) to the M1  stock has been well 
maintained.  The ratio of thrift-institution  deposits  to M2 and to M1 has 
also risen but at a diminishing  rate and the same is true of the ratio of 
thrift-institution  deposits  plus large CDs to M2 and to M1. At first,  this 
substitution,  which  reduced  the costs of maintaining  the successive  mixes 
of Ms, took place  in two ways: ( 1  ) by the accumulation  of the addition  to 
M3 and M5  per unit of GNP in the form of the higher-yielding  M com- 
ponents,  and (2) by a reduction  per  unit  of GNP of the lower-yielding  and 
the interest-free  components  of M3  and  M5.  In the sixties  this  decelerating 
substitution  away from M2 toward  higher-yielding  M assets  began  to be 
accomplished  by the first  method  alone, with no reliance  on the second. 
For reasons  discussed  below, the downward  trend  in M1  per unit  of GNP 
seems  to have shown  only a temporary analogous  tendency  to flatten  out. 
2. Aside from the usual problems of reconciling aggregative  behavior reflected  in 
time series with individual behavior observed in cross-sections, a further complica- 
tion here is that a high relative position in a cross-section  may often be the conse- 
quence of smaller risk aversion  than is typical at that time of those occupying a lower 
position. The economically successful may thus show lower risk aversion than the 
unsuccessful and yet their risk aversion may be higher than it was before they rose 
on the income scale. Furthermore,  even if everyone showed declining risk aversion 
with a rise of income by holding a diminishing  proportion  of their wealth in liquid 
form, they could still hold larger liquid assets in proportion  to their current income. 
Information for a thorough exploration of this problem is lacking, but data relating 
to 1962 do suggest a more than proportionate  rise in M holdings with rising income 
over a substantial segment of the income scale; see Dorothy S. Projector and Ger- 
trude S. Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics  of Consumers (Board of Gover- 
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In a process  of decelerating  substitution,  there  are reasons  to expect a 
stage  such as that  illustrated  by the behavior  of M2  during  the sixties  and 
seventies.  To use an analogy,  if with the passage of time a household 
spends  an increasing  proportion  of its rising  income  on a luxury  good but 
reduces the expenses of acquiring  it by shifting  toward  less expensive 
brands,  it can do this by reducing  in relation  to its income  its acquisition 
of the more expensive  brands  as well as by putting  all of the increment 
into the less expensive  brands.  Yet it is a reasonable  assumption  about 
utility  functions  that,  as its income  rises  and  its effort  to lower  the acquisi- 
tion costs slackens,  the household  will stop reducing  in relation  to its in- 
come its acquisition  of the better  brands  before  it stops making  all addi- 
tions in the form of the less expensive  ones. In terms  of our analogy,  an 
M brand  is "better,"  but also more expensive,  the nearer  it is in the spec- 
trum to money in the narrower  sense of means of payment.  While the 
influence  of the business  sector's  M holdings  on the trends  in the economy 
call for some  qualifications  to this analogy,  they  will not be of great  quan- 
titative  importance  in our exploration  of the behavior  of M2. 
This interpretation  of developments  during  more  than  two decades  may 
be tied in with trends  of the more  distant  past. The work  of Milton  Fried- 
man and  Anna Schwartz  has demonstrated  that  in the historical  long run, 
conceived  of as extending  back to the years  following  the Civil War,  the 
ratio of M2 to income had an appreciable  upward  trend.3  However,  this 
trend did not last beyond World War II. For several years-perhaps 
into the early  fifties-the  postwar  reversal  of the upward  trend  in M2  per 
unit  of GNP represented  merely  an offset  to the particularly  steep  increase 
during  the war; but this interpretation  clearly cannot serve beyond the 
early  fifties.  Since that time,  M2  per unit of GNP at first  showed  a down- 
ward  trend,  followed  in the early  sixties  by a horizontal  trend,  as Fried- 
man noted in a discussion  presented  some years after  the publication  of 
the Friedman-Schwartz  volume.4  This does not exclude the possibility 
that  M2  has maintained  its "luxury  good"  character,  in the sense  of having 
greater  than unitary  income  elasticity  that may have been offset  by other 
3. See  Milton Friedman and Anna  J.  Schwartz, A  Monetary History of  the 
United States, 1867-1960  (Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1963). 
4.  See Milton Friedman, "How Much Monetary Growth?" Morgan Guaranty 
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variables.  This possibility  will also be examined  in the paper.  Yet even in 
this event the income elasticity  of the higher-yielding  components  of M. 
and of M5  seems  to have  become  much  greater  than  that of M2. 
As we see it, the likely explanation  is that the non-M2  components  of 
the broader  M aggregates  did not acquire  their great significance  until 
quite  late in the Friedman-Schwartz  historical  long run and  that  until  that 
time  M2  thus  played  a role much  more  similar  to the recent  role of M3  and 
M,. During  those many  decades  M2  too showed  an upward  trend  relative 
to GNP, while subsequently  this trend was shown only by the higher- 
subscript  M components.  As concerns the upward  trend, the higher- 
yielding  components  seem to have taken  over at a time when federal  in- 
surance  of thrift-institution  deposits was spreading  rapidly  and the de- 
mand for the funds supplied  by these institutions  was strong.  Whereas 
only in the earliest  phases of the shift of the M mix toward  the higher- 
yielding  components  was the process associated  with a reduction  of M2 
per unit of GNP, it has remained  associated  with a reduction  of the ratio 
of M1  to GNP, and also with a reduction,  in relation  to GNP, of specific 
holdings  of liquid assets not included  in any M concept.  It follows that 
from the early  sixties  on, the reduction  of M1  per unit of GNP has repre- 
sented  on balance  a transfer  to the M2  component  consisting  of commer- 
cial-bank  time deposits and savings accounts which have risen corre- 
spondingly.  This is what  is expressed  by the trendless  "M2  velocity." 
Horizontality  of the k2  Trend 
In the analysis  that  follows, 
k, denotes a liquidity  ratio expressed  as the reciprocal  of the GNP 
velocity of M1,  or M1  per unit of GNP; GNP is measured  at annual 
rates,  and M1  as average  holdings  during  the same  period; 
k2, k3, and k5 denote the analogously  defined  lagless "Cambridge  k" 
terms  for M2,  M3,  and  M5,  respectively;5 
knonV,  knon2,  knon3  denote the "Cambridge  k" applicable  to M5 -  M1, 
M5-  M2, and M5 -  M3,  respectively. 
Whether  the trend  in k2 became  horizontal  in 1960 or not until 1962 
5.  For the origin of concepts of this type, see Alfred Marshall,  Money, Credit  and 
Commerce (London: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 43-46. is a matter  of judgment.  We prefer  1962 because,  after  a period  of down- 
trend, that year implies a "soft" landing at the subsequent  "constant" 
level, while a trend  that started  in 1960 implies  a "hard"  landing  (see the 
k2 column  in table 1). The period  of trend  horizontality  has these char- 
acteristics:  (1) the mean  value  of k2  for 1962 through  1975 is 0.421; (2) 
the standard  deviation  in quarterly  data  is 1.19 percent  of the mean,  and 
in yearly  data  is 0.97 percent  of the mean;  and (3) the worst  deviation  in 
the quarterly  data  is about  3 percent  of the  mean,  in the  yearly  data  slightly 
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Table 1.  "Cambridge  k" Values and Related Ratios, 1952-76a 
k valuesb  Related  ratioo 
knonl  knon2 
Year  ki  k2  ka  k5  to  k/  to k2 
1952  0.361  0.475  0.589  d  0.632  0.240 
1953  0.351  0.468  0.591  d  0.684  0.263 
1954  0.356  0.484  0.623  d  0.750  0.287 
1955  0.337  0.460  0.602  d  0.786  0.309 
1956  0.323  0.444  0.600  d  0.858  0.351 
1957  0.309  0.433  0.598  d  0.935  0.381 
1958  0.308  0.448  0.628  d  1.039  0.402 
1959  0.295  0.433  0.616  d  1.088  0.423 
1960  0.284  0.420  0.613  d  1.158  0.460 
1961  0.280  0.428  0.634  0.637  1.275  0.488 
1962  0.266  0.420  0.633  0.640  1.406  0.524 
1963  0.259  0.424  0.650  0.663  1.560  0.564 
1964  0.252  0.421  0.657  0.676  1.683  0.606 
1965  0.243  0.420  0.659  0.682  1.807  0.624 
1966  0.232  0.414  0.645  0.668  1.879  0.614 
1967  0.228  0.422  0.656  0.681  1.987  0.614 
1968  0.224  0.422  0.653  0.677  2.022  0.604 
1969  0.221  0.417  0.643  0.660  1.986  0.583 
1970  0.218  0.413  0.639  0.656  2.009  0.588 
1971  0.215  0.426  0.666  0.694  2.228  0.629 
1972  0.209  0.429  0.682  0.714  2.416  0.664 
1973  0.202  0.420  0.677  0.723  2.579  0.721 
1974  0.197  0.421  0.675  0.731  2.711  0.736 
1975  0.191  0.423  0.687  0.743  2.890  0.757 
1976a  0.180  0.416  0.687  0.729  3.050  0.752 
Sources:  The  basic  data  are from  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  and  U.S.  Bureau 
of  Economic  Analysis. 
a.  The  data  for  1976  cover  the  first three  quarters  only  and  are  preliminary. 
b.  ki,  k2, ka, k6 =  reciprocal  of the  GNP  velocity  of M1, M2, Ms, and  Ms, respectively,  where  the  M  terms 
are  as  defined  in  text  note  1. 
c.  knon1,  knon2 =  the  k terms  applying  to  Ms  -  Ml  and  M5  -  M2,  respectively. 
d.  Prior  to  the issuance  of negotiable  certificates  of  deposit  in  1961,  k5 was  the  same  as  ks. 746  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
less than 2 percent.  It seems  unlikely  that the 1976 observations  will fall 
outside  these  ranges. 
Of course,  during  the years 1962-75 an observer  trying  to look into the 
future  could not have known  the 1962-75 average;  but this qualification 
loses much  of its importance  because  the 1962-63 average  was 0.422 and 
both the 1962-64 and the 1962-65 averages  were 0.421. Subsequently, 
the mean for the period since 1962 declined somewhat-to  0.419 for 
1962-70-and  thereafter  it returned  to 0.421. Deviations  from the pre- 
ceding  year's  k2  values  have  tended  to be quite  a bit larger  than  the devia- 
tions  from  the 1962-75 mean  or from  the successive  means  since 1962. 
The coefficient  of variation  from  the mean  falls from 1.19 to 0.98 per- 
cent  when  a one-quarter  lag is introduced  between  M2  and  money  GNP- 
by this criterion  a "better"  lag than  two quarters-and the mean  value  of 
k2  for 1962 to 1975 then falls from  0.421 to 0.413. But the improvement 
is distinctly  spotty: in many  subperiods  the simultaneous  relation  "wins" 
over  the lagged  one. The lagged  relation  wins  mainly  in years  of significant 
variations  of liquidity  creation,  such as the years  of credit  crunch,  and  the 
years of significantly  stepped-up  liquidity  creation  that followed. 
Even precise constancy  of the economy's  overall k2 would not have 
meant constancy  in the household  sector, since from 1962 to 1975 M1 
holdings of the business  sector have dropped  per unit of GNP and the 
ratio  of its M2  to GNP was not fully  maintained.  But because  the business 
sector's  M1 is not a high proportion  of the economy's  M2-at  present, 
probably  less than 25 percent-constancy of the economy's  k2 implies 
merely  a small increase  in the household  sector's  k2.  Between 1970 and 
1975, according  to table 1, k2  for the economy  as a whole  rose from  41.3 
to 42.3 percent  of GNP. We estimate  that from 1970 to 1975 the house- 
hold sector's  M2  rose from  the 25-26 percent  range  to the 27-28 percent 
range  in relation  to GNP (from the 36-37 percent  to the 38-39 percent 
range in relation to disposable  income).6  Having tried to allocate M 
holdings to individual  sectors,  we have little confidence  in the detailed 
results of more ambitious  quantitative  work based on specific sectoral 
allocation. 
6.  For this estimate, we used the Federal Reserve's Demand Deposit Ownership 
Survey for demand deposits, and the flow-of-funds statistics for ownership of time 
deposits and savings accounts at commercial  banks, and what we consider  reasonable 
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The Upward  Trend  in k3  and  k5 
Both in 1953-62, when  k2  declined  at an annual  compound  rate  of 1.2 
percent,  and over  the subsequent  period  of k2  horizontally,  k3  and  k5  rose 
appreciably  along the growth  path of real GNP. However,  this uptrend 
was interrupted  for fully five years during  the exceptionally  long expan- 
sion in the second  half of the sixties,  and  throughout  our  period  it was not 
uncommon  for this  trend  to be interrupted  (and even  reversed  for a while) 
during  cyclical expansions.  The reason  why the trend  has come through 
is that  the sharp  rises  in recession  years  have  been greater  than any  reduc- 
tion during  expansion  years.  This is illustrated  by figure  1 and  can  be seen 
also in table 1, both of which suggest  a tendency  of the public to raise 
k3 and k5 during  recessions  to such an extent  that any liquidity  loss that 
may occur during  the next expansion  should start from a higher level 
than  it did  on the previous  occasion. 
The results can be expressed  by log-linear  regressions  in which k3 or 
k5  is the dependent  variable  and aggregate  real GNP and  the interest  rate 
on three-month  Treasury  bills are the independent  variables.  The co- 
efficient  of real GNP comes out positive,  that of the bill rate (or, alter- 
natively,  of the commercial  paper  rate) negative.  The regressions  are re- 
ported  below. In this  context  we were  unable  to identify  the complex  con- 
sequences  of population  growth.7 
7. 
(1)  In k3 =-0.420  +  0.056 In Y-  0.024  In r +  0. 832 n (k3)1; 
(3.1)  (3.1)  (3.8)  (13.7) 
Sample period  =  1962:2-1975:4; 
A2 =  0.91; standard error of estimate =  0.008; Durbin-Watson =  1.68. 
(2)  In k5 =-  0. 337 +  0.050 In Y -  0. 022 In r +  0. 925 In (k5)-1, 
(2.1)  (2.2)  (2.9)  (19. 1) 
Sample period  =  1962:2-1975:4; 
A2 =  0.95; standard error of estimate =  0.01; Durbin-Watson =  1.47. 
where Y is real GNP, r is the Treasury  bill rate, and the numbers  in parentheses  are 
t-ratios (here and in later equations), and the data are quarterly  observations. 
Here and in other regressions of this type containing a lagged term on the right- 
hand side, the long-term elasticities corresponding  to the coefficients  of the explana- 
tory variables (here, of  Y and r)  are found by dividing these coefficients by the 
difference  between the number 1 and the coefficient  of the lagged term. 
Equations similar to 2 hold for the preceding period starting in 1952, with both 
the Y and the r elasticities smaller in absolute value (but significant  by conventional 
standards), and with the adjustment  much faster-that  is, with the coefficients  of the 748  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
There is good reason  for not relying  heavily on the numerical  results 
of such regression  analysis.  The specification  of models of this general 
type is inevitably  incomplete.  For one thing,  there  is no way to measure 
expectations  held with changing  uncertainty  concerning  a cyclically  sen- 
sitive rate of return  that bears closely on the attractiveness  of physical 
goods (on investment  in the broad  sense). Even with hindsight  that rate 
of return  cannot  be measured  properly.  The regression  results  hide this 
deficiency  by "pretending"  that decisionmakers  experiencing  a rise in 
income  move up to the desired  higher  money  holdings  very slowly, even 
though  in the given circumstances  this is unlikely  because  usually  money 
intake  is increasing  at the same time. What  happens  in these situations  is 
not a genuinely  slow movement  toward desired  levels but a temporary 
reduction  of the desired  level of money holdings  relative  to income-a 
delay  in developing  the desire  to accumulate  the money  balances  for  which 
there  will subsequently  be a demand.  The delay  occurs  because  of a tem- 
porary  rise of an unmeasured  expected  rate of return  during  cyclical  ex- 
pansions.  The computational  results  hide this for the sample  period by 
suggesting  a low speed  of adjustment  to desired  levels, and  the elasticities 
obtained  cannot be expected  to reflect  accurately  the long-run  effect of 
unspecified  variables.  If the log of M rather  than  the log of k were  defined 
lagged term much smaller (0.493 instead of 0.925).  Until 1961 there was no differ- 
ence between k3 and k5. 
Figure 1 suggests  why models of this sort are apt to show particularly  slow adjust- 
ment for the post-1962 span in which the very long expansion phase of a cycle inter- 
rupted the rise of k3 and of k5 for several years. Taking care of such delays by low 
adjustment coefficients reflects a basic shortcoming of  such models, as our subse- 
quent discussion suggests. 
As for the behavior of large negotiable CDs per unit of GNP-k,on3,  which even 
now is a small fraction of k5-inferences  for the future drawn by comparing equa- 
tions 1 and 2 are practically certain to be wrong. As a result of the difference be- 
tween the two adjustment  coefficients,  that comparison implies a negative long-term 
r elasticity for the CDs. This particular implication is indeed likely to have been 
realistic for the sixties, when the CDs were subject to interest ceilings. For  1970, 
when interest ceilings were removed from large CDs of less than 90-day maturity, 
the data convey the same impression of  a negative relation between the rate of 
change in the volume of CDs and the interest rates on money-market  instruments, 
not because the ceilings on longer maturities  were removed only later, but because 
the volume of the newly deregulated  CDs rose rapidly while money-market  rates de- 
clined though remaining  above time-deposit  rates. But no reasonable  observer could 
avoid the conclusion that from 1973 on CD holdings were positively and strongly 
correlated with money-market rates-not  negatively, as a comparison of our two 
equations would suggest for periods longer than one quarter. - 
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as the dependent  variable,  the "cover-up"  would  be even more  complete, 
and by some criteria  the regression  results would appear to be even 
"better,"  but for the wrong  reason.  This and some further  considerations 
have led us to choose k rather  than  M as the variable  to be explained.8 
Increasing  amounts  have been accumulated  per unit of the growing 
GNP not only of M3  and of M5  but also of the broader  aggregate  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  calls liquid assets  held by private  nonfinancial  domestic 
owners.  However,  this more  comprehensive  liquidity  ratio  rose somewhat 
less because  its non-M components  have declined  relative  to the GNP- 
from about 15 to 11 percent  in the past sixteen  years. 
Methods  of "Cheapening"  the Rising  Liquidity  Provisions 
Tables  2 and  3 illustrate  how  the  increasing  provisions  of k3  and  k5  along 
the growth  path have been made less expensive  to the public  by a shift 
from  k, to knon,  and  from  k2  to kn,02.  The tables  also reveal  that  for some 
time the rise in the ratio of knoni  to k, and in the ratio of knon2  to k2  had 
8.  In an "M model" other than one applying  to Ml, the computational  techniques 
establish a significantly less than unitary coefficient for the log of  Y along with a 
greater than unitary long-term income elasticity of M, thus giving the impression 
that this very large difference is attributable  to slow reactions in achieving desired 
objectives, though in reality the delay reflects the effect of an unspecified variable 
bearing on the objectives themselves. In a "k model" the misleading explanation of 
the delay is much less complete-hence  weaker test results  serve as warning  signals- 
because the techniques cannot associate a negative coefficient for the log of Y with 
a positive long-term income elasticity of k (and this would be the analogy to what 
is happening  in the M models). 
It should be noted also that since random movements of a decision unit's Y are 
here usually associated with random movements of its M intake in the same direc- 
tion, the risk of obtaining a spurious negative correlation  between M/Y(=k)  and Y 
is  small. Also,  because random movements in M/Y  are apt to  be fewer or less 
pronounced than random movements in M, the disturbing  effect of random move- 
ments on the results of the next period (via the lagged term) is apt to be smaller in 
k than in M models. 
Yet the two types of model share other basic shortcomings.  These include the con- 
sequences of our inability to appraise  accurately the uncertainty  surrounding  expec- 
tations concerning  movements in market rates of interest and thus the attractiveness 
of the prevailing long rates relative to the various deposit rates and relative to the 
CD rate and the bill or the paper rate. In this regard, as well as with respect to the 
uncertainty surrounding  the rates on physical investment, the hypothetical steady 
long-run  conditions that are supposed  to be described  by the elasticities  have different 
implications from those of the sequences of disequilibria  actually observed in time 
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developed  both because  k, and k2 had declined and because k0onl  and 
knon2  had risen.  At some point in this process,  increases  in the ratio of 
knon2  to k2  came  to be achieved  by a rise in knon2  alone without  the rein- 
forcement  of reductions  in k2. 
We now turn  to our  suggestion  that  the k, trend  might  also have  moved 
toward  horizontality  had there  not been special  incentives  for a renewed 
dip. For the household  sector  such a flattening  of the k, trend  would  have 
meant  heavy  reliance  on the rise of kn.n0  for a further  reduction  of the cost 
of the still rising  k3  and k5  provisions;  while  for business  enterprise  a flat- 
tening  would not call for similar  emphasis  on the substitution  of higher- 
yielding  M assets  (rather  than  other  assets) for M1. 
During  the period 1966-71 the k, trend  did in fact show a pronounced 
tendency  toward  flattening  (see table 3).  It would be unconvincing  to 
argue  that the substantial  slackening  of the downtrend  in k, was merely 
a phenomenon  accompanying  the interruption  of the rise in k3 and in k5 
during  the later  phases  of the long expansion  of the sixties.  Similar  inter- 
ruptions  in earlier  expansions  occurred  with no slackening  of the down- 
ward trend  in k,; also, in the late sixties the interruption  of the upward 
trend  in k3  and  in k5  did  not strictly  coincide  with  the  flattening  out of k,. 
Some investigators  interpreted  the behavior  of k, in 1966-71 in terms 
of log-linear  M1  demand  functions,  implying  that  movements  in k, can be 
adequately  explained  with unchanging  parameter  values,  by the lowering 
effect  on k, of a rise  in real GNP and  of a rise  in interest  rates.9  Yet Cagan 
and Schwartz,  when comparing  longer periods extending  into the early 
seventies  with  pre-1965  subperiods,  have observed  indications  of changes 
in the values  of the  parameters,  including  a reduction  of the absolute  value 
of the interest-rate  coefficient.  From  some  point  in the seventies,  those  M, 
models  compiled  an obviously  unsatisfactory  and deteriorating  record. 
In view of this evidence,  the explanation  of the temporary  flattening 
tendency  of the k, trend in the 1966-71 period should not rest on the 
9. For more recent contributions,  including  critical appraisals,  see William Poole, 
"Whither Money Demand?" BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 485-500;  Stephen M.  Goldfeld, 
"The Demand for Money Revisited,"  BPEA, 3:1973, pp. 577-638; Phillip Cagan and 
Anna J. Schwartz, "Has the  Growth of  Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary 
Policy?" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 7  (May 1975), pp. 137-59; 
Jared  Enzler, Lewis Johnson,  and John Paulus, "Some  Problems  of Money Demand," 
BPEA,  1:1976, pp. 261-80;  Laurence H.  Meyer, "Alternative Definitions of  the 
Money Stock and the Demand for Money," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Monthly Review, vol. 58 (October 1976), pp. 266-74. t  e  o  -e 
-  l  Mz  tn  N  ^o 
S~~~~~~~t  en tn  CN 'l  W) 0  u  No 
00 
Po 
t  ^mot 
r~~~~~~~~.  CI N eq C1  tn Un  In In 
r  ~  ~~~  A 
_  u 
U  ii 
*N~~~~~~~~~  *  S 
Q~~~~I  tn  m 
d ~~~P%  0N  O  N^  m 
Cl) 
p  A 
On  ON  I  N  tN  en  >  ^ 
Cu  N 
Y 
z~~~ 
soor-o  o-ooc'oo'.O  3 
o  0~~~~~~~~~~t 
Cu  0\R  No^^ 
C  ^u  ^  o'Ctt 
*;~~~  ^  %  I  ef  IIC 
.ld,  . 
C 
0;  .t?  a 
-xa  I 
.8  8  tXN 0  O0  O  00  t 
Ot  0Oan  tn o  e  oo 
tr  .S  1.  .S  .1  .  ~  .l  .l  .l  c 
*O  O 
.  ~  .~ .en .e 
.. 
Wf 0  0 00  O00  eli  '-iC  -14  C~ 
u)  kn  C)  en  It  OC  C1  ^ 
06~~~ 
Inoo  Oo'o  co  000~  oo  N 
C0  )  )  00  C  00  00  1-i0  *3 
%6  cli~~~~~ 
ene 
00e  ce 
00  00e  ene  en  f  o00  Cq 
00 
0 ~~O.-~O.-  0 
~~~~~~~~ 
t  m  ? ^m  ^  F  o  t  t  0 
0  U  O  00  ? 
*4  *  4  *  .*  * 
? 
m  W  N  t  ^  F  N  t 
_ 
0 cZ  of  *0  *4 *S  04 
%6 
eO  ntn 
v  *s  ~~A,  cli  *l  06  o.6  14  We 
S: 
(7  *oN  :4  en  "C  r-  00  qq  r  nt  n00  W: 
Q~~~~~~0 
oo 
A  X  o  NT  n  0  0  = 
.< 
1L  S  >  |>  .  ^  14  *  * 
*co  xs  r;  0  t 
.r  A  >  :  : t  t  :  :  <  tn  W  >  ffi  t  t  ?  310- 
O 
E  a  a  n  *  *  ^  t  *  *  *  *  n  S  o  e  e  Q~~~~~~~~~~~~0.0$ 
.S)| 
=  B 
&~~~~~~1 
C  ,42  D  \e 
F8~~~~~'  >>8t;t@  9  e|0  ,. William  Fellner and Dan Larkins  755 
claim to success of some investigators  in using unchanging  parameter 
values.  In our conception  the temporary,  significant  flattening  of the k, 
trend  may well have had reasons  analogous  to those of the much more 
durable  flattening  of the k, trend.  To analyze  the flattening-out  of k2  with 
unchanging  parameter  values-that  is, without  assuming  a weakening  of 
the basic  propensity  to reduce  the weight  of M2  in the broader  M aggre- 
gates-seems  a hopeless effort.  Nor has the evidence  so far established 
any strong  case for interpreting  the temporary  near-flattening  of the k, 
trend  in the late sixties  in terms  of unchanging  basic propensities. 
Among the quantitative  statements  that can be made, relatively  the 
safest are that (1)  in the absence  of new incentives,  the reductions  of k, 
and of k2  do not last beyond a limited  period; (2)  therefore,  the substi- 
tution of higher-  for lower-yielding  M and k components-the rise of 
ratios  such  as knon2/k2  and  knon,/k,-comes to depend  increasingly  on the 
factors  determining  the rise in k3 and in k5; (3)  the growth  of real GNP 
and changes  in returns  on rival assets presumably  are prominent  deter- 
minants  of the trend  in k, and  k5.  Applying  analysis  based  on unchanging 
parameter  values  to the flattening-out  phase of the lower-subscript  ks, or 
to a renewed  dip resulting  from a revision  of the attitudes  that led to the 
flattening,  is not a promising  undertaking. 
In considering  incentives  for revising  such attitudes  concerning  kl, two 
factors  deserve  emphasis.  One is that the incentive  provided  by the avail- 
ability  of, say, 5 percent  interest  on commercial-bank  savings accounts 
means more in terms  of utility  if the interest  earnings  greatly  reduce  or 
eliminate  a continuing  erosion of the real value of interest-free  liquid 
assets  than if they merely  bring a real gain over the maintenance  of the 
real value of a liquid asset. Thus inflation  is likely to have been one of 
the essential  causes of the new dip of k,. The other important  factor is 
that  the prompt  transformation  of commercial-bank  savings  accounts  into 
checking  deposits  has become so smooth  that, if depositors  have the two 
kinds  of accounts  in the same  bank,  they may  by now  view their  checks  as 
reasonably  safe against bouncing. Furthermore,  after 1971, when k, 
dipped  again  significantly,  interest  rates on commercial-bank  savings  ac- 
counts  continued  to rise,  even  if somewhat  less than  during  1966-71. Also, 
corporations  were recently  permitted  to hold limited commercial-bank 
savings  accounts,  with effects  that will show up mostly  in the data after 
1975. At present  k, ratios  continue  to move  lower. 
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that led to a flattening  of the k2  trend  in the early  sixties.  The differential 
between  the passbook  rates of thrift  institutions  and commercial  banks 
diminished  to one-quarter  of 1 percent  during  that period (though  both 
rates  increased).  On  the other  hand,  rates  of return  on large  CDs  increased 
in some years greatly  to the advantage  of these assets;  but this trend  did 
not hold in all subperiods,  and access  to these assets  is limited.  To reduce 
k2  by moving  into goods rather  than into higher-yielding  M components 
remains  too risky for the typical household;  their demand  for interest- 
bearing  M seems  in fact to have  been strengthened,  rather  than  weakened, 
by the uncertainties  concerning  borrowing  opportunities  and  other  matters 
in the recent  inflationary  period.  The qualifications  called  for by the rela- 
tively small share  of business  in M2  were considered  above, and  here we 
may conclude  that  the k2  problem  understandably  has characteristics  very 
different  from those of the k, problem.  So far there have developed  no 
incentives  for revising  the attitudes  that led to a flattening  of k2 in the 
early  sixties. 
Slowing  of the Substitution  of Higher-Yielding  M Assets for M2 
Assuming  that the k2  trend  is horizontal  and that the k5  trend  reflects 
variables  such as real GNP and  rates  of interest  on money-market  instru- 
ments, the trend  in knon2/k2 from now on will depend  exclusively  on the 
same  variables.  Observed  trends  and  regressions  such  as 1 and  2 in note 7 
suggest  this sort of substitution  process.  One implication  of this sugges- 
tion is that, with a horizontal  k2  trend  and a constant  rate of increase  of 
k5,  the increase  in the kn0n2/k2  ratio  would  continue  to slow,  because  knfl.2 
would make up a continuously  rising  proportion  of k5 and hence the ex- 
tent to which  the growth  rate  of k0on2  would  exceed  the assumed  constant 
growth  rate  of k5  would  be lessening  continuously. 
However,  this conclusion  is based on the behavior  of k3 and k5 alone, 
which  only for a given  trend  in k2  determines  the behavior  of the ratio  of 
the higher-yielding  k components  to k2-that is, the substitution  ratio.  The 
special  uncertainties  in appraising  the influence  of the same  "explanatory" 
variables-such as real GNP and interest  rates-on  the behavior  of k2 
itself are disturbing  if the question  is how long the k2 trend  will remain 
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Reasons  for Abstaining  from  Mechanical  Projections 
Several  important  reasons caution against  simple mechanical  projec- 
tion of the k2  trend.  First, analysis  of this sort is uncomfortably  aggrega- 
tive. We have looked at some disaggregated  data that do not seem to 
contradict  our hypothesis  but also do not support  an equally clear-cut 
disaggregated  story  in all details,  and the level of aggregation  here  warns 
against  overconfidence.  Second, we have not attempted  to appraise  the 
role of a number  of economic  variables  in shaping  the environment  in 
which  the observed  regularities  have developed.  Last  but not least,  institu- 
tional  developments,  such  as interest-rate  regulations  and  the ease  of trans- 
forming  one type  of M into another,  are  unpredictable.  In particular,  if and 
when shifting  thrift-institution  deposits  into means of payment  becomes 
sufficiently  prompt,  costless, and effortless,  k3  might  be the proper  focus 
of analysis  rather  than  k1  or k2. 
Observations  on an Analytic  Ambiguity  and  ConcIuding  Remarks 
Assessing  the future  behavior  of k2,  even on the unrealistic  assumption 
of unchanging  interest  regulations  and institutional  circumstances,  calls 
for a firm  view of what variables  have determined  the post-1962 devia- 
tions of k2 from its horizontal  trend.  The same variables  could then be 
considered  responsible  for the trend horizontality  since 1962, and any 
change  in their  behavior  would  put an end to the era of horizontality  in a 
predictable  way.  But this effort  encounters  serious  difficulties. 
As figure  2 demonstrates,  movements  in money-market  rates  have  been 
associated  with  movements  of k9  in the opposite  direction.'0  However,  the 
10. The graph is a plot of k2 against the commercial paper rate, but the same 
conclusion would be suggested  by using the Treasury  bill rate (see note 11). 
On theoretical grounds one should use here the differential between a money- 
market rate and some representative  commercial-bank  deposit rate as well as the 
differential  between some representative  thrift-institution  rate and the commercial- 
bank deposit rate; but these would be hard to construct. It seemed preferable to 
imply that the large swings in money-market  rates stand for movements relative to 
the upward creeping commercial-bank  deposit rates. As was noted, the differential 
between the savings and loan and the commercial-bank  passbook rates was slowly 
declining during that period. That differential  has not proved a significant  variable 
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Figure  2.  Relation  of k2  to the Commercial  Paper  Rate, 1962-75a 
Natural  log of 1,000  X k2a,b 
1962-75  mean  64  68  75  74 
6.04  -0  . 73 
62  65  e 
6.03  _-6 
6*6 
6.02  -  70 
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1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2.0  2.2  2.4 
Natuiral log of commercial  paper rateb 
Sources:  Same as table 1. 
a.  ka  =  reciprocal  of  the GNP  velocity  of  M2 (defined in  text note  1). 
b.  The  scaling  of  the  axes  exaggerates  the  slope  twentyfold  in  this  simple  regression.  For  a 
regression involving further variables, see text note 11. 
same figure-a  simple  regression  with  no adjustment  for the role of other 
variables-shows that this effect was not symmetrical  in the two direc- 
tions. Therefore,  the upward  trend in interest  rates during the period 
1962-75 has not, on balance,  become  associated  with a downward  trend 
in k2. Something  has suppressed  any k2-reducing  trend effect of interest 
rates. 
It is very likely even on a priori  grounds,  and it is empirically  demon- 
strable,  that  one of several  measurable  variables  showing  an upward  trend 
can be introduced  to "explain,"  in the purely  technical  sense, why the k2- 
reducing  effect  of the trend in interest  rates  was suppressed.  One  way is to 
introduce  total real  M liquidity-or better,  its non-M2  component-as an 
additional  variable,  and to demonstrate  that the sign of its coefficient  is 
positive (and thus is the inverse  of the sign of the coefficient  of interest 
rates). Other  variables,  including  real GNP, can also be made  to perform William  Feliner and Dan Larkins  759 
this function  of "offsetting"  the trend  effect  of the commercial  paper  rate 
or, alternatively,  of the  Treasury  bill  rate." 
If such regression  results were taken at their face value, one would 
conclude  that in a period of horizontal  r trends,  the k2 ratio would be 
rising,  because  the other  variables-such as real  liquidity  or, alternatively, 
real income-would continue  to show an upward  trend.  As will be seen, 
this upward  trend  in k2 would be very mild. Quite aside  from this, these 
other  variables  could be stealing  the show from an unmeasured  variable 
in the background  of the regressions.  We suggested  earlier  that, whereas 
accelerating  inflation  probably  played  an essential  role  in promoting  trans- 
fers  from  k, to the equally  "safe"  interest-bearing  component  of k2,  it may 
also have raised k2 because it intensified  uncertainties,  especially  about 
borrowing  opportunities.  This rising  uncertainty  is an unmeasured  vari- 
11. If Mnon2  stands for real M balances other than M2, and r for the commercial 
paper rate, then with the 1962-75  mean value of k2 of 0.421, the quarterly  devia- 
tions from the mean might be "explained"  by: 
(3)  In 
k2 _  -  0.181  +  0.042  ln Mnon2  -  0.031  In r. 
0.421  -  (2.6)  (3.1)  (4.4) 
R2 =  0.67; standard error of estimate =  0.007; Durbin-Watson (adjusted) =  1.5. 
However, if  the period is  truncated in  1972, the coefficients become sufficiently 
different (larger in absolute value) to throw doubt on the value of that equation as 
a forecasting device, even if a change of the absolute value of the coefficients  in the 
same direction happens to have a compensating effect that rescues the predictions 
for some intervals. 
For  1962-75  the coefficients and the tests for all practical purposes come out 
identically if r is defined as the Treasury  bill rate (rather than the commercial paper 
rate); in this case, however, R2 would be a shade lower (0.65). 
The same coefficients apply to the explanatory variables in regressions in which 
In k2 alone is placed on the left-hand side and the log of the mean value (ln 0.421) 
is carried over to the right-hand  side. If, further, the log of the preceding  period's k2 
is added on the right-hand  side-thus  obtaining an adjustment  model-the  results 
show rapid adjustment  toward elasticities not much different from the coefficients 
reported  above. 
Finally, if  in such an adjustment model the explanatory variable Mnon2  is re- 
placed with real GNP (Y),  and r is defined  as the commercial  paper rate, the results 
for 1962-75 are 
(4)  In k2 =-  0.757  +  0.041 In Y -  0.024 ln r +  0.407 In (k2)Q  . 
(2.6)  (2.0)  (2.8)  (1.6) 
A2  =  0.66; standard error of estimate =  0.007; Durbin-Watson (adjusted) =  1.8. 
If the definition  of r is the Treasury  bill rate, 
(5)  In k2 =-  0. 697 +  0.041 In Y-  0.024 In r +  0.477  n (k2).1 
(2.7)  (2.1)  (2.8)  (2.3) 
R2 =  0.66; standard error of estimate  -  0.007; Durbin-Watson (adjusted)  1.9. 
We have not tried to "explain"  our relatively brief pre-1962 downtrend  in k2 in 
these terms. For such an effort to succeed, Y and r elasticities other than those esti- 
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able not included  in our regressions,  but it has resulted  from inflation 
along with the rising  trend  of the measured  variable  r. This could  well be 
the reason  why the behavior  of r since 1962 has on balance  been associ- 
ated with neither  a decrease  nor an increase  in k2,  even though  the short- 
run effect of a change  in r has been an opposite change  in k2. On this 
interpretation,  the measured  variables  that trend  upward,  and appear  to 
explain the supression  of the k2-reducing  effect of the rising  trend in r, 
have  played  no essential  role. They  merely  continued  to rise  in a period  in 
which inflation-induced  uncertainty  rose. Accordingly, a horizontal  r 
trend  would  be associated  with  a horizontal  k2  trend,  not with  a rising  one. 
Some considerations  favor this latter interpretation,  but others argue 
for leaving open the question  of whether  during  the period of k2 trend 
horizontality  the trend  effect  of rising  interest  rates  was  not, after  all, offset 
by a measured  variable  with a rising  trend,  as various  regressions  suggest. 
One such reason  is that any uncertainty  that raises  k2  might  be expected 
to raise  k3  as well.  A k3-raising  effect  of inflation  uncertainty  would  in turn 
imply  that  when  k3  regressions,  such  as 1 and  2 in note 7, are  estimated  for 
1953-75, they would underpredict  k3  for 1965-75. This is so because  in 
that period  the rise in money  rates  of interest  reflected  inflation,  while in 
the preceding  years  it did not. Yet the regressions  we have examined  do 
not indicate  a tendency  to underpredict  k3  during  1965-75. On the other 
hand,  inflation  uncertainty  could  have  raised  k2  without  raising  k3  because 
of the pronounced  narrowing  of the margin  between  the passbook  rates  of 
thrift  institutions  and of commercial  banks.  Also, we had reason  to ques- 
tion the numerical  results  derived  from  such  regressions  as 1 and  2. 
Hence it remains  an open question  whether,  during  the period 1962- 
75, the effect  on k2  of the trend  in interest  rates  was suppressed  by factors 
that would  have been present  even had the interest  trend  been horizontal 
(and in that case would have succeeded  in raising  k2) or by factors  that 
come and go with the kind of inflation-induced  interest  trend observed 
during  the past decade. Only in the latter  case would the k2 trend  have 
been  horizontal  even  for a horizontal  interest  trend,  and  short-run  fluctua- 
tions in r would then merely cause short-run  deviations  of k2 from its 
trend. 
Pragmatically,  this ambiguity  may not deserve  much  attention.  Even if 
the correct  interpretation  of the period  of a horizontal  k2  trend  were  that 
some variable  such as total real M liquidity,  or real non-M2  liquidity,  or 
real income has tended to raise k2 while r has tended to reduce it, the William  Fellner and Dan Larkins  761 
prospective  decennial  rate  of increase  in k2  would  probably  be very small 
for a horizontal  trend  in money-market  rates.  A corollary  is that  it seems 
to take large changes  in interest  rates to have a noteworthy  effect  on k2. 
These  conclusions  follow  from  the  parameter  values  referred  to in note 1  1, 
on any reasonable  assumption  concerning  trends  in the explanatory  vari- 
ables.12 
What stands  up firmly  is not the regression  results-ours  or those of 
other authors-but the horizontality  of the k2  trend  over about  a decade 
and a half,  with  the dispersion  characteristics  discussed  in this  paper.  Am- 
biguities  in the interpretation  of the regression  results  are, of course,  dis- 
turbing,  yet not because  it would  matter  much  whether  k2  will be trendless 
or have a very  mild  trend.  This  is not the main  reason  for abstaining  from 
mechanical  projections  of the behavior  of k2 and for supporting  one's 
views about  the prospects  by "judgmental"  considerations.  The main  rea- 
sons are the uncertainties  of aggregative  analysis,  the unpredictability  of 
institutional  change,  and  the  vagueness  of any  appraisal  of variables  whose 
behavior  may have shaped  the environment  in which  various  regularities 
have  been observed. 
12. From 1953 to 1975 real M balances other than M2 rose at an annual com- 
pound rate of 7.8 percent, and from 1962 to 1975 the increase was smaller. Regres- 
sion 3 suggests that a 7.8 percent increase  would raise k2  by 3.2 percent  of its present 
value in a decade. The regressions  using real GNP rather than real Mn"n2  as an ex- 
planatory variable suggest an even smaller decennial increase in k2 for a 3.5 percent 
yearly growth of real GNP. To put it differently, all these regressions suggest that 
even if no variable had offset the k2-reducing  effect of the r trend from 1962 to 1975, 
the k2-lowering  effect of the interest  movements  would have been small. Some models 
seem to point to a somewhat greater  k2-lowering  effect of past trends  in interest  rates 
and, correspondingly,  to a somewhat greater k2-raising  effect of the offsetting trend 
in real GNP. But we find various properties  of these models unconvincing. 762  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 3:1976 
Discussion 
JAMES  TOBIN REMINDED  the conference  that considerable  stability  in 
average velocity over a period is quite consistent with considerable varia- 
tion in the rate of change of velocity. Since it is the rate of change of the 
money  supply  that  is supposed  to be important  in stabilizing  the economy, 
stability  in the rate of change  of velocity is a more important  issue for 
policy purposes  than the stability  of velocity itself. Tobin reported  that 
over  the period 1965-74, average  M2  velocity  had indeed  been constant: 
the  mean  rate  of change  was a trivial  -0.3  percent  per  year.  However,  the 
standard  deviation  of quarterly  changes  of velocity  was 3.4 percent (an- 
nual  rate). Tobin inferred  from  this that one could not place much  faith 
in a constant  relationship  between  the rate of change  of M2  and the rate 
of change  of income.  He had also experimented  with  lagged  relationships; 
a typical  example  was the correlation  of 0.4 that he had found between 
percentage  changes  of money  income  and  percentage  changes  in M2  lagged 
two quarters.  Robert J. Gordon  reported  similarly  disappointing  results 
from  an effort  to predict  the growth  of final  sales from the recent  growth 
of M2. 
Tobin  noted  also that  the broader  the concept  of money  that  is adopted 
as a control  variable,  the louder  the noise that  creeps  in between  the Fed- 
eral Reserve's  instruments  of control-central bank reserves, discount 
rates,  and  so on-and  the resulting  outcome.  Arthur  Okun  was concerned 
that  the sudden  adoption  of M2  or any  other  aggregate  as an instrument  of 
policy control  would change  the supply  function  for that class of assets, 
thereby  jeopardizing  any  previous  regularity  of its behavior.  William  Fell- 
ner pointed  out that the paper  was concerned  with the small  yearly  and 
quarterly  deviations  of M2  velocity  from  the known  mean  values  of more 
extended  preceding  periods,  not with the larger  deviations  of one short 
period's  value  from  that  of the preceding  quarter  or year.  He also stressed 
that,  in pointing  out the stability  of the velocity  of M2,  the authors  had  not 
meant  to imply  the reliability  of M2  as a single  instrument  of control.  That 
issue required  an understanding  not only of the process of interest-rate 
determination  but also of how other  factors  may  have  contributed  to shap- 
ing the environment in which the M2 regularity was observed. Such an William  Fellner and Dan Larkins  763 
investigation  went beyond  the scope of their  paper,  and much  of what  is 
involved  in this  broader  problem  calls for "judgmental"  appraisals. 
Fellner  and Stephen  Goldfeld  exchanged  views on the difference  in the 
functional  forms  in their  respective  papers.  Fellner stated  his preference 
for specifying  the equation  in terms  of k, rather  than M, because  it had 
superior  dynamic  properties:  for example,  an increase  in income led to 
an immediately  rising k2, while Goldfeld's  specification  implied that k2 
fell at first  then  rose. Goldfeld  emphasized,  however,  that  this  was a result 
of differences  in the underlying  specifications  of the equations  and not 
simply of different  forms of the dependent  variable.  Fellner agreed  but 
reiterated  his preference  for a specification  that did not rely on a lengthy 
process  of stock  adjustment  that  started  by moving  k2  in the opposite  direc- 
tion  when  income  rose,  and  then  turned  around  in this  regard. 
Tobin said that he could not find a clear conceptual  basis for M2.  M] 
could be characterized  as the circulating  medium  of exchange  and M3  as 
including  all assets  on which  the interest  rates  are  fixed  by the government 
-either  at zero  or some  other  level;  M2,  on the other  hand,  seemed  simply 
to be a measure  of the size of commercial  bank assets and liabilities- 
excluding  certificates  of deposit and bank capital.  Fellner observed  that 
the differences  between  M, and  M2  have  been narrowing  and M2  can now 
be characterized  as the medium  of exchange,  subject  to a telephone  call. 